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Abstract
We put a probabilistic framework on the Demographic Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In this model, cooperating and defecting individuals are placed on a torus
to move and play prisoner’s dilemma game, if they are on the same site.
Each individual accumulates its payoff into a quantity called wealth. If an
individual becomes wealthy enough, it can have an offspring. If its wealth
becomes negative, it disappears.
In this framework we prove that if if the Sucker payoff is far greater
than the Reward then for all initial state almost surely all cooperators will
die. Moreover if the Temptation payoff (resp. Reward) are far greater than
the Punition (resp. Sucker payoff) then for all initial state with positive
probability cooperators and defectors live ad vitam eternam. We also set a
Mean Field model on the demographic prisoner’s dilemma and prove on a
linearized version of the Mean Field model that with weaker assumptions
with positive probability Cooperators live ad vitam eternam.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Spatial Model 10
2.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Almost sure extinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Coexistence ad vitam eternam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Mean Field model 14
3.1 Reminders on Markov process and infinitesimal generators . . . . 14
3.2 Mean Field Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1 Definition and intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.2 Justification of the mean field model . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Proofs on the Spatial Model 20
4.1 Almost sure extinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Coexistence ad vitam eternam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
02
01
8v
1 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
2 M
ay
 20
17
5 Proof on the Mean Field system 29
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
References 31
1 Introduction
Playing particle systems as a modeling tool in the evolution literature have
been introduced by [Smith and Price, 1973]. Since, many ecological models
have used playing particle system’s approach (see a list of examples in the
book of [Hartl and Clark, 1997]). Yet a lot of the literature on the evolution-
ary games have been focused on random matching over finites games models
[Boylan, 1992, Ellison, 1994, Weibull, 1997]. Then motivated by biological ap-
plications, spatiality have been introduced in models [Nowak and May, 1993,
Szabó and Tőke, 1998, Hauert, 2002]. In those previous models, individuals
cannot move and evolution is managed by a Wright-Fisher generation system
(i.e. at each step of the evolution one whole generation gives birth to another
generation and dies).
[Epstein, 1998] introduced a model where individuals can move and are not syn-
chronized (they die at different times and gives birth at different times). This
model is called Demographic Prisoner’s dilemma. Before explaining the model
and a bit of its probabilistic framework, let us give an intuition inspired by the
article of [Turner and Chao, 1999].
You put viruses on a torus. Each virus has embedded in his RNA one of the
two following behaviors: either she manufactures diffusible (shared) intracellu-
lar product, either she sequesters it and take advantage of the virus producing
the product. Each virus can move on a fixed torus. They also have energy such
that when they have intracellular product they get energy and when they manu-
facture it or sequester nothing they lose energy. A virus without energy dies. A
virus with a lot of energy can split and bring a child (with its RNA) in the torus.
Notations. text
We denote by N the set of non negative integers and N∗ the set of positive
integers.
text
The model is:
1. Let (Z/mZ)2 be a fixed torus with m ∈ N∗. It is the space where individ-
uals move.
2. We make the assumption that the torus cannot bear an infinite number
of individuals. Let us call K ∈ N∗ the maximum number of individuals in
the torus.
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3. The individuals move according to continuous time independent symmet-
ric simple random walks. At random times (of rate d ∈ R∗+) an individual
moves from his position to one of its nearest neighbors with equal proba-
bility, as shown in the following example of evolution.
Figure 1: Example of moving of particles
4. Each individual has a wealth. If the wealth becomes non positive, the
individual dies (and then stop playing with the other individuals).
5. The wealth changes through games. The game is the prisoner’s dilemma:
• The players have two actions to Cooperate or to Defect.
• If both Cooperate they get a Reward R. But if one of the two defects,
the Defector gets a Temptation payoff T, and this payoff is bigger
than the Reward. If a Cooperator is being Defected instead of getting
a reward he gets a Sucker payoff −S. If both players Defect (let us
call them Player 1 and Player 2) the nature flips a coin, if it is head
Player 1 gets a Punishment payoff of −2P and Player 2 gets a payoff
of 0, if it is tail Player 2 gets a Punishment payoff of −2P and Player
1 gets a payoff of 0.
• Then the payoff satisfies T > R > 0 > and S > P > 0. This is
summarized in the following payoff matrix (action Top and action
Left are Cooperate, action Bottom and action Right are Defect).
(
(R,R) (−S,T)
(T,−S) (P1, P2)
)
,
where (P1, P2) is a random variable with distribution 12δ(−2P,0) +
1
2δ(0,−2P)
• Playing Cooperate is strictly dominated by playing Defect.
• To determine the action played by the individuals we place ourself in
the framework where: "Each individual plays only one action, either
he will Defect every time either he will Cooperate every time". Then
a particle has a fixed action (Cooperate or Defect). There are two
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kinds of particles: the ones who always Cooperate and the ones who
always Defect.
• At the end of each game the wealth are updated, adding the respec-
tive payoff of the game played.
• To make the games happen, each couple of individuals is given a
Poisson process independent of everything of parameter v. When this
Poisson process realizes, if the individuals are on the same site and
if their wealths are positive the individuals play together. Otherwise
nothing happens.
6. Each individual is given a Poisson process of parameter b > 0. When
this birth Poisson process realizes if the individual’s wealth is more than a
given threshold wc > 0 and if there is less than K individuals on the torus
then the individual gives birth to an offspring. The offspring has the same
strategy as its unique parent (it cooperates if its parent cooperates, defects
if its parent defects). Moreover the fixed birth wealth 0 < w0 < wc of the
offspring is given by its parent. That is after the birth (then the parent
lose wealth, and the child begins its life with a wealth equal to w0).
[Epstein, 1998] introduced the first Demographic Prisoner’s dilemma model,
and explore it doing simulations. The demographic prisoner’s dilemma has been
a popular model [Axelrod, 2000, Ifti et al., 2004, Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006] in
theoretical biology. Also since he used multi-agent as a way of modeling evo-
lutionary game theory, Epstein made an useful link between computer sciences
and biology as presented by [Tumer and Wolpert, 2004].
Yet in conclusion of his article Epstein said: "The only claims that can be
advanced definitely are that this specific complex of assumptions is sufficient
to generate cooperative persistence on the timescale explored in the research.
[...] Obviously it would be worthwhile to [...] if possible, assess their generality
mathematically."
After this article, [Dorofeenko and Shorish, 2002], assuming statistical indepen-
dence, proved the convergence of the Epstein model (when the payoff and the
step of the grid tend to 0) to a reaction-diffusion process. They also studied via
numerical results this reaction diffusion process. [Namekata and Namekata, 2011]
add reluctant players (Tit for Tat players where the first action is Defect) in the
model. They studied the extended model using simulations.
The main contributions of this article is generalizing Epstein model mathe-
matically that is:
• Putting a probabilistic framework on the Epstein model without doing
too strong assumptions (slightly modifying the payoff matrix, making in-
dividuals moving following independent simple random walks instead of
exclusion process).
• Proving asymptotic (on time) results on the survival of the cooperators.
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• Introducing a Mean Field model (or well mixed)
• Proving that we can insure a certain level of cooperation without too
strong assumption on the payoff matrix.
Let us introducing the first results.
Notations. • We call configuration the data of the positions, the behaviors,
and the wealth of every particles. Then a configuration is an element of
E := ((Z/mZ)2×R+×{−1, 0, 1})K where {−1, 0, 1} indicates the behavior
of a particle.
• Since Markov processes are defined by a collection of probability distribu-
tion on the space of right continuous, left limited functions from R+ to E
(this space is denoted D(R+, E)) indexed by E. We denote the distribu-
tions of the previous model (Pσ)σ∈E (σ represents the initial state).
Theorem. There exists a constant µ > 0 depending only on v, d,K, b, w0, wc
and m such that if:
µR < S
then for each initial configuration σ with at least one defector with positive
wealth:
Pσ({Eventually all the cooperators will be dead}) = 1.
text
Theorem. There exists a constant ν, ν′ > 0 depending only on v, d,K, b, w0, wc
and m such that if:
ν(S+ w0) < R
ν′(2P+ w0) < T
then for each initial configuration σ with at least two cooperators and one
defector with positive wealth:
Pσ({The cooperators and defectors present in the beginning never die}) > 0.
Those are qualitative results. The first theorem says that when the Sucker
payoff is far bigger than the Reward payoff, then with any initial configuration
(except the trivial ones) the cooperators die almost surely. The second theorem
says that if the Reward is far bigger than the sum of the Sucker payoff and the
birth wealth then from every non trivial configuration with positive probability
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the cooperators will never die.
The two theorems talk of the red and blue area (or the areas pointed by the
arrows) on the following graph. In order to understand better the behavior of
this system, we draw some simulations with the following data:
• The size of the torus is m = 7.
• There are initially 10 cooperators and 10 defectors.
• Initially all individuals have a wealth of 10.
• The rate of the game Poisson processes is the same than the rate of the
moving Poisson processes d = v = 5.
• The Temptation payoff is T = R + 1 and the Punishment payoff is P =
S− 1.
• The stopping time of the simulation is 10,000 moves, games or birth Pois-
son process realizations. (Usually in the previous simulations this density
becomes nearly constant after 3,000 realizations of Poisson processes).
• The critical wealth (wealth that allows to give birth) is: wc = 10.
• The birth wealth for a child is: w0 = 3.
• The maximum number of particles K = 10m = 107.
Method
We make a batch of 100 simulations of the system for each couple of payoff
(R,S) (R,S ∈ {0, . . . , 100}). At the end of each simulation we measure the
number of cooperators with a positive wealth. After drawing these simulations
we take the average of this measure over all these 100 simulations. Finally we
make the figure saying that the color red corresponds to a small number of co-
operators with a positive wealth at the end of the simulation, and the color blue
corresponds to a high number of cooperators with a positive wealth at the end
of the simulation (dark red correspond to 0 cooperator with a positive wealth
at the end of the simulation).
In order to understand better the area in green and orange (intermediate
area between the two pointed areas) we will consider the following Mean Field
model:
• particles stop giving birth.
• there is no spatial condition.
• instead of considering a linear interaction with many particles, we consider
one defector and one cooperator with non linear interaction (the evolution
depends also on the distribution of the process).
• all particles begin with the same distribution of wealth.
6
Figure 2: Survival of cooperators in function of the Reward and the Sucker
payoffs
The Mean Field system is the Markov process (C(t),D(t))t. We will look at the
distribution of (C(t))t. The intuition of P(C(t) = w) = p is: at time t, p% of
the population of cooperators has a wealth w. We define (C(t),D(t))t by: (with
β0 + ρ0 = 1 fixed) and an initial measure m0
D(tDn+1)−D(tDn ) = 1D(tDn )>0 UD(tDn+1)
C(tCn+1)− C(tCn) = 1C(tCn )>0 UC(tCn+1)
where:
- (tDn )n and (tCn)n are sequences of Poisson times of intensity v2 (i.e. for
example with ND a Poisson process of parameter v2 for all n ∈ N∗ tDn is
defined by tDn = inf(t > 0/NDt ≥ n)).
- for I = {tCn, n ∈ N} ∪ {tDn , n ∈ N}, all t ∈ I and UD(t) and UC(t) are
random variables independent from everything such that:
UD(t) =

−2P with probability 12ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
T with probability β0P(C(t) > 0)
0 with probability 1− β0P(C(t) > 0)− 12ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
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and
UC(t) =

−S with probability ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
R with probability β0P(C(t) > 0)
0 with probability 1− β0P(C(t) > 0)− ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
The intuition behind these formulas is that we update (for example C(t)) fol-
lowing a Poisson process of intensity v2 . If C > 0 we update it doing:
C(t)←

C(t)− S with probability ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
C(t) +R with probability β0P(C(t) > 0)
C(t) with probability 1− β0P(C(t) > 0)− ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
An important remark is that the law of the wealth of any cooperator, resp
any defector, (as a stochastic process) in the spatial model converges in finite
dimensional distribution to C, resp D when m2 = N and d → +∞ then when
N → +∞.
This distribution has three principles:
• A drift (positive or negative)
• A diffusion
• An absorbing bound on 0 causing non linearity.
Hence this process is non linear. We consider a simpler process instead : a
linearized process (C(t),D(t))t.
C(tCn+1)− C(tCn) = UC(n)
D(tDn+1)−D(tDn ) = UD(n)
avec (UC(n))n et (UD(n))n two independent sequences of i.i.d. random variables
such that
UC(n) =

−S with probability ρ0
R with probability β0
0 with probability 1− β0 − ρ0
et
UD(n) =

−2P with probability ρ02
T with probability β0
0 with probability 1− β0 − ρ02
On this linearized system we have the following results:
Theorem 1.1. Let us suppose that:
β0R − ρ0S > 0
8
Figure 3: Distribution of the Mean Field Wealth
Then we have: for any fixed q0 > 0
C(t) −→ +∞ Pq0a.s.
Pq0(∀t ≥ 0,C(t) > 0) > 0
We also have the following proposition about the concentration of wealth.
Proposition. For all q0 ∈ R+
We denote :
m := v2
(
β0R − ρ0S) , σ2 := v2 (β0R2 + ρ0S2) .
Then we have : ∀η > 0, t ≥ 0
Pq0
(
C(t) ∈
[
q0 + mt− η
√
σ2t, q0 + mt+ η
√
σ2t
])
≥ 1− η−2.
Moreover for all τ such that:
τ < q0 − η
2σ2
4m ,
then
P(C(t) > τ) ≥ 1− η−2.
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This article is in two parts. In the first one, we introduce the spatial model
with his probabilistic framework. We also state and give the sketch of the proofs
of the two qualitative theorems. In the second part, we give some reminders
on Continuous Time Markov processes (in particular the theory of infinitesimal
generators). We do that in order to describe and justify the Mean Field model.
Then we state Mean field theorem. The proofs of the theorems are in the
appendix.
2 Spatial Model
Remark. We call particle, player or individual, the agent defined in the following.
2.1 Model
Let us give a probabilistic framework for the Demographic prisoner’s dilemma
of [Epstein, 1998]. Let (Ω, T ,P) be a probability space.
1. Let m ∈ N∗. Let K ∈ N∗.
2. For a particle i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, let us denote Xi(t) its position at time
t ∈ R+. Then ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} Xi is a continuous simple symmetric
random walk on (Z/mZ)2 of rate d ∈ R+.
3. We denote the wealth of particle i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} at time t ∈ R+ by Y i(t) ∈
R.
4. The action played by i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is coded in a process Zi. Particle
i plays Cooperate if Zi = 0 and plays Defect if Zi = 1. If Zi = −1 the
particle does not play.
5. The wealth changes through games.
• To make the games happen, each couple of individuals (i, j) is given a
Poisson process independent of everything of parameter v. When this
Poisson process realizes (for example at a time t), if the individuals
are on the same site (i.e. if Xi(t) = Xj(t)), if their wealths are
positive (i.e. if Y i(t) > 0 and Y j(t) > 0) and if Zi, Zj are both not
equal to -1 the individuals play together. Otherwise nothing happens.
Then if an individual has a negative wealth, he can’t play with the
other individuals.
• A point to notice is that two players cannot lose wealth simultane-
ously. As a consequence, two individuals cannot kill each other.
• At the end of each game (between for example player i and j) Y i and
Y j are updated, adding the payoff of the game played by i and j.
6. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} when Y i > wc, and when the birth Poisson process
of i realizes, he gives birth to an offspring. The index j of the offspring
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is drawn uniformly randomly from {j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, Zj = −1}, and then
Xj , Y j , Zj are updated doing Xj ← Xi, Y j ← w0 and Zj ← Zi.
We have that (X(t), Y (t), Z(t))t is a Continuous Time Markov Chain, we
denote by (Fdt )t its filtration such that (X(t), Y (t), Z(t))t is adapted to (Fdt )t.
Definition 2.1. We call set of configuration
(
(Z/mZ)2 × R× {−1, 0, 1})K :=
E. A configuration is an element usually denoted σ of
(
(Z/mZ)2 × R× {−1, 0, 1})K .
We denote the non trivial configurations by:
• C the set of configurations with at least 2 cooperators and 1 defector with
positive wealths.
• C′ the set of configurations with at least 1 cooperator and 1 defector with
positive wealths.
A particle system is a Continuous Time Markov Chain with state space: the
space of configuration. It is usually denoted (X(t), Y (t), Z(t))t := (σt)t.
Before stating the theorems, let us remind the data of the model.
• m ∈ N the size of the torus, state space of the position.
• K ∈ N∗ is the maximum number of players on the torus.
• We fix the payoff initially T > R > 0 > and S > P > 0. The payoff
matrix is (
(R,R) (−S,T)
(T,−S) (P1, P2)
)
,
where (P1, P2) is a random variable with distribution 12δ(−2P,0)+
1
2δ(0,−2P)
• The position is denoted by X, the wealth by Y and the strategy by Z.
If Z = 0 the particle is a cooperator, if Z = 1 the particle is defector. If
Z = −1 the particle cannot play (because she is not born yet).
• If Y ≤ 0, the particle stop playing. If Y > wc > 0 the particle can give
birth to a particle with initial wealth w0 < wc.
• d ∈ R+ is the rate of the Poisson process making a particle move. v ∈ R+
is rate of the Poisson process making a couple of particles plays together.
b ∈ R+ is the rate of the Poisson process making the player trying to have
an offspring.
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2.2 Almost sure extinction
In this subsection we will show a first qualitative theoretic result: when the
sucker payoff S is far greater than the reward payoff R then almost surely for
any initial configuration (with at least one defector) cooperators will die.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a constant µ > 0 depending only on v, d,K, b, w0, wc
and m such that if:
µR < S (1)
then for each initial configuration with at least one defector σ:
Pσ({Eventually all the cooperators will be dead}) = 1.
Sketch of the proof. The aim of the proof is showing that the total wealth
of cooperators goes to 0 almost surely. The sketch of the proof is the following:
1. The only way the total cooperator wealth decreases is via games with
defectors (giving birth does not change the total wealth of cooperators).
Since (Z/mZ)2 is finite, going from a configuration σ0, the first game
between a defector and a cooperator arrives at a finite random time τ . At
this time the variation of total wealth is less than −S+RNτ where N is
the Poisson process counting the games.
2. Then to apply a Law of Large Number argument we want a condition such
that:
E (−S+RNτ ) < 0.
3. To find this condition we have to upper bound uniformly in the configu-
rations the first time for a defector to play with a cooperator. This will
be one of the main difficulty of the proof.
(a) We remark that there exists a minimum number m of realizations of
Poisson processes such that for each non trivial configuration there
is a Cooperator-Defector game in less than m realizations.
(b) Since the evolution is managed by Poisson processes, for every con-
figuration σ there is a Cooperator-Defector game in less than m re-
alizations of Poisson processes with probability ε(σ) > 0.
(c) Since ε(σ) is the probability of a particle moving and a game hap-
pening, ε does not depend on the wealth of the individuals. Since if
we don’t look at the wealth of the individuals there is a finite number
of configurations, we take ε the minimum over these configurations.
This part is really detailed in the proof.
(d) The probability that a Cooperator-Defector game happens after km
realizations of Poisson processes is bugger than (1− ε)k.
4. We finish the proof using Borel Cantelli’s Lemma.
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2.3 Coexistence ad vitam eternam
In this subsection we will show a second qualitative result that is: when the
reward is far greater than the sucker payoff and the initial offspring wealth then
with positive probability the cooperators live until the end of times.
Theorem 2.3. There exists a constant ν, ν′ > 0 depending only on d, v,wc,w0,
K and m such that if:
ν(S+ w0) < R (2)
ν′(2P+ w0) < T (3)
then for each configuration σ with at least two cooperators and one defector:
Pσ({the cooperators and defectors of σ never die}) > 0
Sketch of the proof. The main ideas are to consider a Ghost system and
then to extend the result of the Ghost system using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequalities and Borel-Cantelli Lemma. We call the system introduced in the
first section True system.
1. In the Ghost system, everybody plays even with negative wealth. Also
whenever something in the system happens all individual’s wealth decrease
of w0 (except if an individual gives birth, this particular individual does
not lose additional wealth). If in the Ghost system we can prove that
every individual always have positive wealth then this Ghost system is
actually the True system.
2. Using a Burkholder-Davis-Gundy argument with Borel Cantelli’s Lemma,
we prove on the Ghost system that the minimum wealth over all indi-
viduals Cmint → +∞ a.s. when t→ +∞.
3. We just have to consider an event (of positive probability) such that no
individual has non positive wealth until they accumulated enough wealth
to make the coupling between the Ghost system and the True system.
Theorem 2.2 and Thm 2.3 are qualitative results. In order to have quanti-
tative results we consider in the following a Mean Field model. In simulation
we notice that birth are really useful for maintaining the cooperation (see for
example Run 3 and Run 4 of Eptein [Epstein, 1998]), in order to guarantee some
result on the survival of cooperators in the Mean Field model we won’t consider
births.
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3 Mean Field model
3.1 Reminders on Markov process and infinitesimal gen-
erators
Let us firstly give some reminders about Markov processes.
One good way to study Markov processes is via their distribution. For a com-
plete separable state space F , a processX = (X(t))t≥0 has value in the canonical
space.
Definition 3.1 (Canonical space). The canonical spaceD(R+, F ) is the space of
right continuous functions from [0,+∞) to F with left limits, endowed with the
Skohorod topology associated to its usual metric. With this metric, D(R+, F ) is
complete and separable (see the book of Ethier Kurtz [Ethier and Kurtz, 1986]
for more details).
We denote by (Tt)t the natural filtration associated to D(R+, F ). We define
the canonical process X := (X(t))t≥0 by:
∀t ≥ 0, X(t) : ω ∈ D(R+, F ) 7→ ω(t) ∈ F
To define a Markov process in a discrete countable state space F (which will
be the case here), we need an initial measure ν on F and a matrix called rate
matrix (A(x, y))x,y∈F with A(x, x) = −
∑
y∈F
y 6=x
A(x, y). For x 6= y A(x, y) ≥ 0
gives the rates of transition of the future process from x to y. With this matrix
we define the generator (which is one of the main tool in the study of Markov
processes) of the following Markov process such that: for each f bounded and
measurable (for the Borel sets of F ) from F to R (this set is denotedMb(F )),
and for all x ∈ F :
Af(x) =
∑
y∈F
A(x, y)[f(y)− f(x)]
The generator is a bounded linear operator on the bounded functions from F
to R. We note in the same way a rate matrix A = (A(x, y))x,y∈F and the
associated Markov generator A : Mb(F ) → M(F ) (with M(F ) the space of
measurable functions of F ). We will always denoting the matrix with two entries
(for example A(., .)) and the generator with no entry (for example A).
Conversely giving a generator we can construct the rate matrix looking at the
rates (terms that will be before the [f(y) − f(x)]) in the expression of the
generator.
Definition 3.2. Let A be a rate matrix and an initial measure ν we can con-
struct a Markov process X as follow:
1. Let (Y (n))n be a Markov chain in F with initial distribution ν and with
transition matrix
(
A(x,y)
|A(x,x)|
)
x,y∈F
. We allow |A(x, x)| = 0 by taking for
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one y0 ∈ F A(x,y0)|A(x,x)| = 1 and for all y 6= y0 A(x,y)|A(x,x)| = 0. We put y0 only to
have (Yn)n well defined, y0 doesn’t have any interest to X as we will see
in the following.
2. Let ∆0,∆1, . . . , be independent and exponentially distributed with pa-
rameter 1 (and independent of Y (.)) random variables.
3. We define the Markov process (X(t))t in F with initial distribution ν and
generator A by:
X(t) =

Y (0), 0 ≤ t < ∆0|A(Y (0),Y (0))|
Y (k),
k−1∑
j=0
∆j
|A(Y (j),Y (j))| ≤ t <
k∑
j=0
∆j
|A(Y (j),Y (j))|
(4)
Note that we allow A(x, x) = 0 taking ∆/0 =∞.
Since it will be constant in the evolution, we denote N the (initial) number
of particles. Let us firstly introduce the generator of the spatial system (but
without birth). Let us begin by some notations
Notations
Let (Ω, T ,P) be a probability space. Let (e1, . . . , eN ) be the canonical basis of
RN (with N ∈ N∗). Let (e11, e21, e12, . . . , e1N , e2N ) be the canonical basis of (R2)N .
We denote E =
(
(Z/mZ)2 × R× {0, 1})N . We identify ((Z/mZ)2 × R× {0, 1})N
to ((Z/mZ)2)N×RN×{0, 1}N , then we can write (x, y, z) ∈ ((Z/mZ)2 × R× {0, 1})N
with x ∈ ((Z/mZ)2)N , y ∈ RN , z ∈ {0, 1}N .
Let us denote Cb(E) the set of continuous bounded functions from E to R.
We denote by PN = {(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , N}/i 6= j} all the individuals couples
which can play together.
The infinitesimal generator A with domain Cb(E) of (X,Y, Z) is: for all
f ∈ Cb(E) and for all (x, y, z) ∈ E
Af(x, y, z) = Adf(x, y, z) + vAgf(x, y, z). (5)
The part Ad is the generator representing the motion of the individuals. The
individuals move following independent random walks, then Ad is defined by:
for all f ∈ Cb(E):
Adf(x, y, z) =
N∑
i=1
2∑
c=1
∑
=±1
d
2× 2 [f(x+ e
c
i , y, z)− f(x, y, z)]. (6)
The generator Ag is the generator representing the evolution of the wealth of
individuals through games. Let us give firstly Ag then the explication of how it
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works. We have for each function f ∈ Cb(E):
Agf(x, y, z) =
∑
(i,j)∈PN
1
21xi=xj1yi>0yj>0

1zi=0,zj=0(f(x, y +Rei +Rej , z)− f(x, y, z))+
1zi=1,zj=0(f(x, y +Tei − Sej , z)− f(x, y, z))+
1zj=1,zi=0(f(x, y +Tej − Sei, z)− f(x, y, z))+
1zi=1,zj=1
( 1
2 (f(x, y − 2Pej , z)− f(x, y, z))
+ 12 (f(x, y − 2Pei, z)− f(x, y, z))
)
 (7)
Let us explain a bit this generator:
• 1xi=xj represents the spatial structure meaning that a game makes the
wealth change only if the two individuals are on the same site.
• 1yi>0
yj>0
checks if both individuals have a positive wealth (i.e. there wealth
are positive). To have the generator of the ghost system, the only change
is: replacing this indicator function by 1.
• the big bracket represents the change of wealth through the game of the
two individuals. If z = 0 the individual is a cooperator, if z = 1 the
individual is a defector. The term 1zi=1,zj=0 looks at the strategies of
the players and choose the right payoff to give to the individuals. For
example if individual 1 and 2 are playing (both have a positive wealth and
on the same site) if individual 1 cooperates and 2 defects then individual
1 gets a payoff of −S and individual 2 gets T, the term in the generator
representing this type of transition is:
1z1=0,z2=1[f(x, y − Se1 +Te2, z)− f(x, y, z)].
Notations. The distribution of the previous (X,Y, Z) defined by the generator
(5) is: µd,N .
3.2 Mean Field Model
3.2.1 Definition and intuition
The Mean Field process is a non linear Markov process. That means that the
temporal marginals of the distribution µ of the process is described by a gen-
erator also depending on these time marginals µ. For that purpose we call
this kind of generator non-linear generator. The change between a non linear
Markov process and a homogeneous Markov process is: when determining the
transitions in an homogeneous Markov process you have to look where the pro-
cess is, while in the non linear case to determine the transition you look both
where the process is and where it could be.
The Mean Field system is the non linear Markov process (C(t),D(t))t: for
β0 + ρ0 = 1 fixed (representing the initial density of cooperators and defectors)
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defined by: an initial probability measure of R+, m0 representing the initial
distribution of wealth of all individuals and an increment relation:
D(tDn+1)−D(tDn ) = 1D(tDn )>0 UD(tDn+1) (8)
C(tCn+1)− C(tCn) = 1C(tCn )>0 UC(tCn+1) (9)
where:
- (tDn )n and (tCn)n are sequences of Poisson times of intensity v.
- for I = {tCn, n ∈ N} ∪ {tDn , n ∈ N}, all t ∈ I and UD(t) and UC(t) are
random variables independent from everything such that:
UD(t) =

−2P with probability 12ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
T with probability β0P(C(t) > 0)
0 with probability 1− β0P(C(t) > 0)− 12ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
and
UC(t) =

−S with probability ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
R with probability β0P(C(t) > 0)
0 with probability 1− β0P(C(t) > 0)− ρ0P(D(t) > 0)
(C(t),D(t))t represents the wealth of a typical cooperator and a typical de-
fector in an infinite population of individuals moving at a high speed.
3.2.2 Justification of the mean field model
To arrive to the Mean Field model from the spatial model we have to assume
that:
• There is no birth anymore. As a consequence Z is constant over time. We
also set N ∈ N the number of particles in the system.
• The collection (Zi)1≤i≤N are i.i.d with distribution β0δ0 + ρ0δ1 (with
β0 + ρ0 = 1 previously fixed).
• The moving rate d belongs to N instead of R+. This is done in order to
have an homogenization result.
• The size of the torus depends on the initial number of particles. We set:
m2 = N . (We can also not link the size of the torus and the initial number
of particles but in that case we have to slow the time of evolution replacing
(X(t), Y (t), Z)t by (X(t/N), Y (t/N), Z)t).
• Initially the distribution of wealth of all individuals is m0 probability
measure of R+.
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The generator of the spatial system is A with domain Cb(E): for all (x, y, z) ∈ E
Af(x, y, z) = Adf(x, y, z) + vAgf(x, y, z).
with Ad defined in (6) and Ag in (7).
Using Theorem 4.2 of [Gibaud, 2016], when d goes to +∞, we have that there
exists µ probability measure of D(R+,R×{0, 1}) such that the particle system
described by the generator (5) is µ-chaotic. The analytic way of describing µ
is done in the following. The useful consequence of that is the following con-
vergence in finite dimensional distribution: with (Y, z) random variable taking
value in D(R+,R× {0, 1}) and with distribution µ
∀i ∈ N, (Y i, Zi) D
−→
d→+∞
then
N→+∞
(Y, z). (10)
Let us describe analytically µ. In order to make the notations lighter we use
the following:
• ρt := P(Y (t) > 0|z = 1),
• βt := P(Y (t) > 0|z = 0).
To have a good description of the distribution of (Y (t), z)t we use evolution
equations given in Corollary 4.3 of [Gibaud, 2016]. The distribution of (Y (t), z)t
verifies the following evolution equations: with L(Y (0)) = m0 and L(z) =
ρδ0 + (1− ρ)δ1:
• for all y ∈ R
∂tP(Y (t) = y|z = 0) = v1y>Rβ0βtP(Y (t) = y −R|z = 0)
+vρ0ρtP(Y (t) = y + S|z = 0)
−v(ρ0ρt + β0βt)P(Y (t) = y|z = 0)
(11)
• for all y ∈ R
∂tP(Y (t) = y|z = 1) = v1y>Tβ0βtP(Y (t) = y −T|z = 1)
+v ρ
0ρt
2 P(Y (t) = y + 2P|z = 1)
+v ρ
0ρt
2 P(Y (t) = y|z = 1)
−v(ρ0ρt + β0βt)P(Y (t) = y|z = 1).
(12)
We want to prove that (C,D) is a good description of (Y (t), z)t. Firstly let
us denote β′t = P(C(t) > 0) and ρ′t = P(D(t) > 0). Let’s verify that (C(t))t
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and (D(t))t verifies the ordinary differential equation (11),(12). Because for all
y ∈ R+ ∀y′ /∈ {y + x : x ∈ {−R,S}}, P(C(t+ h) = y|C(t) = y′) = o(h) we have:
P(C(t+ h) = y) = P (C(t+ h) = y ∩ C(t) = y) + P (C(t+ h) = y ∩ C(t) 6= y)
= P (C(t+ h) = y|C(t) = y)P (C(t) = y)
+ P (C(t+ h) = y ∩ C(t) ∈ {y −R, y + S}) + o(h)
=
(
1− vh(β0β′t + ρ0ρ′t)
)
P (C(t) = y)
+ vhβ0β′t1y>RP (C(t) = y −R) + vhρ0ρ′tP (C(t) = y +T) + o(h).
P(C(t+ h) = y) is equal to:
P(C(t) = y)vh(1−ρt−βt)+1k>RvhβtP(C(t) = y−R)+vhρtP(C(t) = y+S)+o(h).
Dividing by h and making h → 0 we get the evolution equations (11) and
(12) by saying that for all y ∈ R P(Y (t) = y|z = 0) = P(C(t) = y) and
P(Y (t) = y|z = 1) = P(D(t) = y) .
Since this process is non linear, we analyze a linearized version (C(t),D(t))t.
The linearized system is a system where cooperators and defectors can play
even if their wealth are negative. It is a Mean field ghost version. The wealth
of cooperators in the linearized (C(t))t is defined by an initial measure m0 and
an increment relation:
C(tCn+1)− C(tCn) = UC(tCn+1) (13)
where:
- (tCn)n are defined in (8).
- for all t ∈ {tCn, n ∈ N} and UC(t) are random variables independent from
everything such that:
UC(t) =

−S with probability ρ0
R with probability β0
0 with probability 1− β0 − ρ0
The consequence of this linearization is the following theorem that gives
us a simple condition to have "survival" of cooperators ad vitam eternam with
positive probability.
Theorem 3.3. Let us suppose that:
β0R − ρ0S > 0 (14)
Then we have: for a fixed q0 > 0 when t→ +∞ Pq0 almost surely
C(t) −→ +∞
and
Pq0(∀t ≥ 0,C(t) > 0) > 0.
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We also have a result about the concentration of wealth of cooperators.
Proposition 3.4. For all q0 ∈ R+
We denote :
m := v
(
β0R − ρ0S) , σ2 := v (β0R2 + ρ0S2) .
Then we have : ∀η > 0, t ≥ 0
Pq0
(
C(t) ∈
[
q0 + mt− η
√
σ2t, q0 + mt+ η
√
σ2t
])
≥ 1− η−2. (15)
Moreover for all τ such that:
τ < q0 − η
2σ2
4m ,
then
P(C(t) > τ) ≥ 1− η−2.
4 Proofs on the Spatial Model
Before beginning the proofs let us introduce some useful tools. In Section 2.1,
every movement, game, birth is managed by independent Poisson processes
with rates d,v or b. Instead of considering this collection of Poisson processes
we consider:
1. A unique Poisson process with rate K(b + d) + K(K−1)2 v i.e. the sum of
the rates of the previous Poisson processes. This Poisson process gives a
sequence of Poisson times (tn)n
2. A sequence (independent of everything) of independent random variables
(Cn)n selects if a movement, game or birth happens. An element of this se-
quence choose a movement with probability Kd
K(b+d)+K(K−1)2 v
, a game with
probability
K(K−1)
2 v
K(b+d)+K(K−1)2 v
and a birth with probability Kb
K(b+d)+K(K−1)2 v
.
3. 3 sequences (Emn )n, (Egn)n, (Ebn)n, (independent of everything) of i.i.d ran-
dom variables uniformly choosing the agents. (Emn )n and (Ebn)n are made
of uniform on {1, . . .K} random variables. (Egn)n is made of uniform on{
1, . . . , K(K−1)2
}
random variables.
4. At the n-th realization of the unique Poisson process, Cn chooses the
type of evolution (movement, game, or birth). If Cn = movement (resp
birth) then Emn (resp Ebn) gives the particle that will move (resp will
give birth (if she is wealthy enough and if there are less than K particles
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on the torus)). If the particle moves, we draw Vn an other uniform on
{Top,Bottom,Left,Right} random variable to decide where the particle
moves. If Cn = game then Egn gives the couple of particles that will play
(if their Z 6= −1, if they are on the same site and if their wealths are
positive).
In this section, instead of considering continuous time Markov process (X(t), Y (t), Z(t))t
we consider the induced Markov chain (Xn, Yn, Zn)n := (σn)n where ∀n ∈ N
(Xn, Yn, Zn) = (X(tn), Y (tn), Z(tn)).
Definition 4.1. We call the photograph of a configuration σ, the data of the
positions of individuals and their strategies. The photograph of σ can be seen
as the equivalent class of σ for the following equivalence relation: σ ∼ σ˜ if and
only if ∀x ∈ (Z/mZ)2, ∀z ∈ {0, 1}
Card
{
i ∈ {1, . . .K}, Xi = x, Y i > 0, Zi = z} = Card{i ∈ {1, . . .K}, X˜i = x, Y˜ i > 0, Z˜i = z} .
In words, two configurations are equivalent if and only if on each position x ∈
(Z/mZ)2 there is the same number of cooperators with positive wealth and
defectors with positive wealth.
We denote by p(•) the canonical projection on the space of photographs.
Remark. There are less than
K∏
N=0
(2m2)N = (2m2)
K(K+1)
2 photographs. We call
q the number of photographs. Those photographs are denoted p1, . . . , pq.
Notations. For simplicity, we will denote the wealth of cooperator i (with
Zi = 0), Ci and the wealth of defector j (with Zj = 1), Dj .
For a configuration σ we denote NC(σ) (resp. ND(σ)) the set of the indexes of
the cooperators (resp. defectors) with positive wealth.
4.1 Almost sure extinction
In this section we prove Theorem 1.
Proof. text
Firstly let us define the first cooperator-defector time. For that let us denote
for all n ∈ N, Ctotn :=
∑K
i=1 1Zi=0Y
i
n the sum of wealth of cooperators.
Definition 4.2. We define τ the first time when a cooperator-defector game
happens that is:
τ1 = inf
{
n ∈ N∗/Ctotn − Ctotn−1 < 0
}
Let us denote (τi)i the sequence of these cumulated stopping time with τ0 = 0.
If there is no cooperator left after τi we define for all k ∈ N∗ τi+k = +∞ a.s.
. That is the time of the first Cooperator-Defector game is τ1, the time of the
second one is τ2 et so on.
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Firstly let us prove the uniform (on the configurations) upper bounding
lemma.
Lemma 4.3. There is m ∈ N and ε > 0 such that for each configuration σ ∈ C′
and all s ∈ R we have:
Pσ(τ1 > s) ≤ (1− ε)bs/mc
Proof. Firstly let us notice, if there is at least one defector initially, defectors
cannot be extinct. Indeed the only way that a defector dies is via Defector-
Defector game yet since the payoff of such a game is a random variable with
distribution 12δ(0,−2P) +
1
2δ(−2P,0) then, when they play together two defectors
cannot die at the same time. As a consequence there will be at least one defec-
tor left at any time. Moreover since (Z/mZ)2 is finite we have for each σ ∈ C′
τ1 < +∞ Pσ a.s.
Let (Tn)n be the sequence of events Tn = {τ1 = n}. Let m the maximum
number of realizations of Poisson process for a defector to play with a cooperator
with positive probability in all configurations i.e.
m = max
σ∈C′
min{n ∈ N/Pσ(Tn) > 0}.
Because there is a finite number of photographs the existence of m is insured.
Then there is ε > 0 such that for each configuration:
Pσ(τ1 ≤ m) ≥ ε (16)
For each configuration σ0 ∈ C′ and all k ∈ N∗ we have:
Pσ0(τ1 > km) = Pσ0(τ1 > m)Pσ0(τ1 > km|τ1 > m)
≤ (1− ε)
∑
σ1∈C′
Pσ0(τ1 > km, σm = σ1|τ1 > m)
Moreover by the Strong Markov property, we have:
Pσ0(τ1 > km) ≤ (1− ε)
∑
σ1∈C′
Pσ0(τ1 > km|σm = σ1, τ1 > m)Pσ0(σm = σ1|τ1 > m)
≤ (1− ε)
∑
σ1∈C′
Pσ1(τ1 > (k − 1)m)Pσ0(σm = σ1|τ1 > m)
≤ (1− ε)k
k∏
i=1
∑
σi∈C′
Pσi−1(σm = σi|τ1 > m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≤ (1− ε)k
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Now that the lemma is proved let us use it to prove the theorem.
Eσ(Ctotτn+1 − Ctotτn |∃i ∈ NC(τn) Ciτn > 0) =
∑
σ′∈C′
Eσ
((
Ctotτn+1 − Ctotτn
)
1στn = σ
′|∃i ∈ NC(τn) Ciτn > 0
)
=
∑
σ′∈C′
Eσ′
(
Ctotτ1 − Ctot0
)
Pσ
(
στn = σ′|∃i ∈ NC(τn) Ciτn > 0
)
≤
∑
σ′∈C′
(Eσ′ (τ1)R − S)Pσ(στn = σ′|∃i ∈ NC(τn) Ciτn > 0)
≤ µR − S.
The hypothesis of the theorem is:
ν = µR − S < 0
We have: for all n ∈ N
Ctotτn+1 =
n∑
k=0
Ctotτk+1 − Ctotτk + Ctot0
Let σ ∈ C′ we get:
Eσ(Ctotτn+1) = Eσ(C
tot
0 ) +
n∑
k=0
Eσ(Ctotτk+1 − Ctotτk )
= Eσ(Ctot0 ) +
n∑
k=0
Eσ(Ctotτk+1 − Ctotτk |∃i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk > 0)Pσ(∃i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk > 0)
+
n∑
k=0
Eσ(Ctotτk+1 − Ctotτk |∀i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk ≤ 0)Pσ(∀i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk ≤ 0)
≤ Eσ(Ci0) + ν
n∑
k=0
Pσ(∃i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk > 0)
But ν < 0 and ∀n ∈ N Eσ(Ctotτn ) > −KS then we have:
+∞∑
k=0
Pσ(∃i ∈ NC(τk) Ciτk > 0) < +∞.
Applying Borel Cantelli’s Lemma we have: Pσ almost surely eventually all co-
operators will be dead.
4.2 Coexistence ad vitam eternam
Before proving Theorem 2.3, let us prove an almost sure divergence lemma.
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Lemma 4.4. Let (Xn)n a Markov chain on R such that:
• ∃X random variable in R+ such that: ∀x0 ∈ R, Ex0(X) ≤ κ, Ex0(X2) ≤ κ′
and Ex0(X4) ≤ κ′′ and such that: ∀x0 ∈ R ∀n ∈ N
|Xn+1 −Xn| ≤ X Px0 a.s.
• ∃ X˜ random variable from (Ω,A,P) to R with positive expectation E(X) =
α > 0 such that:
∀s ∈ R, ∀x0 ∈ R, Px0(X1 −X0 > s) ≤ P(X˜ > s)
Then we have: for a fixed 0 < δ < α Pσ almost surely: ∃N0(σ) ∈ N, ∀N > N0(σ)
XN > δN −→ +∞.
Corollary 4.5. Let (σn)n a Markov chain of a space E with countable dimen-
sion. Let (Xn)n be one of its coordinates. Let us suppose
• ∃X random variable in R+ such that: ∀x0 ∈ R, Ex0(X) ≤ κ, Ex0(X2) ≤ κ′
and Ex0(X4) ≤ κ′′ and such that: ∀x0 ∈ R ∀n ∈ N
|Xn+1 −Xn| ≤ X Px0 a.s.
• ∃ X˜ random variable from (Ω,A,P) to R with positive expectation E(X) =
α > 0 such that:
∀s ∈ R, ∀x0 ∈ R, Px0(X1 −X0 > s) ≤ P(X˜ > s)
Then we have: for a fixed 0 < δ < α Pσ almost surely: ∃N0(σ) ∈ N, ∀N > N0(σ)
XN > δN −→ +∞.
The proof of the corollary is the same as the proof of the lemma except that
the initial condition is for example with σ ∈ E {σ0 = σ} and the Strong Markov
property are done on (σn)n. Let us begin the proof of the lemma.
Proof. To prove that Xn −→ +∞ almost surely we firstly prove that (Xn)n
is a sub-martingale and use Doob decomposition, then we upper bound the
expectation of the quadratic variation of the martingale part of Xn in order to
finally use Borel Cantelli’s Lemma with Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality.
1. Let us prove that (Xn)n is a sub-martingale. Let x ∈ R.
Ex(Xn+1|Xn) = Ex (Xn +Xn+1 −Xn|Xn)
= Xn + EXn (X1 −X0)
≥ Xn + α
≥ Xn.
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Then using a Doob decomposition we get: for all x ∈ R
Xn = Mn +
n−1∑
k=0
Ex (Xk+1 −Xk|Xk)
with M0 = 0 and (Mn)n =
(
n−1∑
k=0
Xk+1 − Ex (Xk+1|Xk)
)
n
a martingale.
2. Now let us upper bound for all x ∈ R and all N ∈ N, Ex
(
[MN ]2
)
=
Ex
((
N−1∑
k=0
(Mk+1 −Mk)2
)2)
• Let us prove that ∃c > 0 such that ∀k ∈ N ∀x ∈ R Eσ((Mk+1 −
Mk)2) ≤ c. First let us rewriteMk+1−Mk in function of the variation
of Xk.
Mk+1 −Mk = Xk+1 −Xk − Ex(Xk+1 −Xk|Xk).
We get using Strong Markov property:
Ex (|Xk+1 −Xk| |Xk) = EXk(|X1 −X0|) ∈ [−κ, κ]
Then we get:
|Xk+1 −Xk − Ex(Xk+1 −Xk|Xk)| ≤ |Xk+1 −Xk|+ κ
Then using Strong Markov property we have: ∀x ∈ R
Eσ((Mk+1 −Mk)2) ≤ Eσ
(
EXk (X1 −X0)2
)
+ 3κ2 ≤ κ′ + 3κ2 := c
• Let us prove that ∃c′ > 0 such that ∀N ∈ N and ∀x ∈ R Ex([MN ]2) ≤
N2c2 +Nc′
Using the previous arguments we have: ∃c′ > 0 such that for all
k ∈ N:
Ex((Mk+1 −Mk)4) ≤ c′
We have:
Ex([MN ]2) =
∑
0≤k,`≤N−1
Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)2(M`+1 −M`)2
)
=
∑
0≤k 6=`≤N−1
Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)2(M`+1 −M`)2
)
+
N−1∑
k=0
Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)4
)
Using Strong Markov property we have for all k < `:
Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)2(M`+1 −M`)2
)
= Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)2Ex
(
(M`+1 −M`)2|Fτ i`
))
= Ex
(
(Mk+1 −Mk)2EX
τi
`
(M`−k+1 −M`−k)
)
≤ cEx((Mk+1 −Mk)2) ≤ c2.
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Finally we have:
Ex([MN ]2) ≤ N2c2 +Nc′ (17)
3. Firstly let us notice that Ex([−MN ]2) ≤ N2c2 +Nc′.
To finish the divergence of (Xn)n we need Burkhholder-Davis-Gundy in-
equality [Beiglböck et al., 2015] which says that for 1 ≤ p < +∞ there
exists ap < +∞ such that for every N ∈ N and every (Mn)n martingale
we have:
E
((
max
1≤n≤N
Mn
)p)
≤ apE
(
[MN ]p/2
)
Then we have: 0 < δ < α
Px
(
min
0≤n≤N
Mn < −N(α+ δ)
)
= Px
(
max
0≤n≤N
−Mn > N(α+ δ)
)
≤ Px
((
max
0≤n≤N
−Mn
)4
> N4(α+ δ)4
)
≤ 1
N4(α+ δ)4Ex
((
max
0≤n≤N
−Mn
)4)
≤ a4 1
N4(α+ δ)4Ex([−MN ]
2) ≤ a4N
2c2 +Nc′
N4(α+ δ)4
which is summable.
Applying Borel Cantelli’s lemma we have Px almost surely: ∃N0(σ) ∈ N,
∀N > N0(x)
XN ≥MN + αN > δN −→ +∞.
Let us now prove Theorem 2.3.
Proof. The configuration σ0 is fixed for the sequence of the proof.
Definition 4.6. For all configuration σ ∈ C, for a cooperator i ∈ NC(σ) we
denote τ i1 the first time where there is a game between i and a cooperator.
τ i1 = inf
{
n ∈ N∗/Cin − Cin−1 > 0
}
Let us denote (τ in)n the sequence of these cumulated stopping times (by the
same way we define the cumulative stopping times in the previous proof) with
τ i0 = 0 for all cooperators.
The issue here is that we can have extinction of the cooperators. Hence we
don’t have ∀σ ∈ C ∀i ∈ NC(σ) τ i1 < +∞ Pσ a.s.
Hence we have to consider an other system and couple them.
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1. We call the system introduced in Section 2.1 the True System. Let Cin be
the wealth of cooperator i ∈ NC(σ) at time n ∈ N in the True System.
2. The other system is called the Ghost system. In this system we have
that:
• cooperators and defectors can play even if they have negative wealth,
• cooperators cannot give birth,
• at each step of time, there is a decrease of w0 of cooperator wealths,
• when defectors give birth they don’t loose wealth (this part is not
necessary to make the proof but make the proof easier).
We denote the probability measure associated to the Ghost system G. For
example probability that the wealth of cooperator i ∈ NC(σ0) is 3 in the Ghost
system is denoted Gσ0
(
Cin = 3
)
.
It is the following system (σt)t that we couple to (σt)t. Since the cooperators
won’t die in the Ghost system we have ∀σ ∈ C ∀i ∈ NC(σ) τ i1 < +∞ Gσ
a.s. also we have the following upper bounding lemma. The proof is the same
as Lemma 4.3, the only modification is to change Tn = {τ1 = n} by Tn ={
max
i∈NC(σ0)
τ i1 = n
}
Lemma 4.7. There is m ∈ N and ε > 0 such that for each configuration σ ∈ E
with at least two cooperators and all s ∈ R we have:
Gσ
(
max
i∈NC(σ)
τ i1 > s
)
≤ (1− ε)bs/m¯c
We denote G the expectation using the probability measure G. We look at
the wealth of one individual then the birth it gives, make its wealth decrease,
then the upper bounding of the variation of wealth has to take it into account.
Using the same argument as those in the previous theorem, we prove that:
∃ν > 0 such that: ∀n ∈ N ∀σ ∈ E with at least two cooperators
Gσ
(
Ciτ in+1
− Ciτ in
)
≥ R − ν(S+ w0) := α > 0
Also for all n ∈ N we have: (because R < S+w0)
|Ciτ in+1 − C
i
τ in
| ≤ (S+ w0)τ i
Then using Lemma 4.7 we can apply Corollary 4.5 to get: for a fixed 0 < δ < α
∀i ∈ NC(σ) Gσ almost surely:
Ciτ in > δτ
i
n −→ +∞
Then intersecting those events we have for a fixed 0 < δ < α, Gσ almost
surely:
∀i ∈ NC(σ), Ciτ in > δτ
i
n −→ +∞. (18)
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Now let us prove that min
i∈NC(σ)
Cin cannot go under 0 infinitely often. Because
we have ∀n ∈ N ∀k ∈ {τ in, . . . , τ in+1} Cik > Ciτ in−(S+w0)(τ
i
n+1−τn) and because
Ciτ in
> δτ in ≥ n we have for all n ∈ N:
{∃k ∈ {τ in, . . . , τ in+1},Cik ≤ 0} ⊂
{
δτni ≤ (S+ w0)(τ in+1 − τ in)
}
⊂
{
min
j∈NC(σ)
δτ jn ≤ (S+ w0) max
j∈NC(σ)
(τ jn+1 − τ jn)
}
⊂
{
δn ≤ (S+ w0) max
j∈NC(σ)
(τ jn+1 − τ jn)
}
Hence we get: for all n ∈ N
Gσ
(
min
i∈NC(σ)
min
τ in≤k≤τ in+1
Cik ≤ 0
)
≤ KGσ
(
max
i∈NC(σ)
(τ in+1 − τ in)(S+ w0) > δn
)
≤ K(S+ w0)2 1
δ2n2
Gσ
(
max
i∈NC(σ)
(τ in+1 − τ in)2
)
which is summable using Lemma 4.7. Then we have with (18)
Gσ
(
min
i∈NC(σ)
Cin ≤ 0 i.o
)
= 0. (19)
We do the same reasoning with the defectors. We have ∃ν′ > 0 and for all
i ∈ ND(σ) there exists (τ˜ in) such that there is m˜ ∈ N and ε˜ > 0 such that for
each configuration σ ∈ E with at least one cooperator and one defector and all
s ∈ R we have:
Gσ
(
max
i∈ND(σ)
τ˜ i1 > s
)
≤ (1− ε˜)bs/m˜c
Then we get for a fixed 0 < δ′ < T− ν′(2P+ w0), Gσ almost surely:
∀i ∈ ND(σ), Diτ˜ in > δ
′τ˜ in −→ +∞ (20)
and also we have:
Gσ
(
min
i∈ND(σ)
Din ≤ 0 i.o.
)
= 0 (21)
Let D = min
(
min
i∈NC(σ)
min
n∈N
Cin, min
i∈ND(σ)
min
n∈N
Din
)
, using (18), (19), (20) and
(21) we have for all σ ∈ C Gσ(D = −∞) = 0. A a consequence for 0 < p ≤ 1
fixed, ∃ L ∈ R such that:
Gσ(D ≤ L) ≤ p
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Let us denote σ+L the set of configuration such that for all σ¯ ∈ σ+L p(σ) = p(σ¯)
and the wealth of every individual with positive wealth in σ is increased by at
least |L| in σ¯. Then if in σ an individual has a wealth of k > 0, in configurations
of σ + L he has a wealth of k + |L|. As a consequence we have NC(σ¯) = NC(σ)
and ND(σ¯) = ND(σ).
Since in the Ghost system, the evolution of wealth only depends on the pho-
tographs we have: for all σ¯ ∈ σ + L
Gσ(∀n ∈ N ∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪ND(σ), Y in > 0) ≥ 1− p
Let n0 ∈ N such that:
Gσ(∀n ∈ {0, . . . , n0},∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪ND(σ), Y in > 0 and σn0 ∈ σ + L) > 0
We denote {∀n ∈ {0, . . . , n0},∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪ ND(σ), Y in > 0 and σn0 ∈ σ +
L} := En0(σ + L). We have using Markov property: Gσ(∀n ∈ N,∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪
ND(σ), Y in > 0) is equal to:
Gσ(En0(σ + L))Gσ+L(∀n ∈ N,∀i ∈ NC(σ + L) ∪ND(σ), Y in > 0) > 0
Since in {∀n ∈ N,∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪ ND(σ), Y in > 0} cooperators always have
positive wealth, on this event the Ghost system is just the True system and
we get:
Pσ(∀n ∈ N,∀i ∈ NC(σ) ∪ND(σ), Y in > 0) > 0
5 Proof on the Mean Field system
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
In this part we will prove Theorem 3.3
Let us begin the Proof.
Using the Law of Large Numbers we have for all q0 > 0, Pq0 a.s. for all t > 0
∃N ∈ N such that tN ≤ t < tN+1
1
N
C(t) = q0
N
+ 1
N
N∑
n=1
UC(tCn) −→
N→+∞
β0R − ρ0S
Then if β0R− ρ0S > 0 we have Pq0 a.s. C(t) −→
t→∞ +∞ and since the increasing
are bounded, as a consequence for all η > 0 there exists M ∈ RZ + SZ such
that:
Pq0
(
min
t∈R+
C(t) > M
)
≥ 1− η
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Since C is a Levy process i.e. since the increments of C don’t depend on where
C is, we have:
Pq0+|M |
min
t∈R+
C(t) > M + |M |︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 ≥ 1− η
Let T > 0 be such that
Pq0
(
min
t≤T
C(t) > 0,C(T ) = q0 + |M |
)
> 0
Hence we get using Markov property:
Pq0
(
min
t∈R+
C(t) > 0
)
≥ Pq0
(
min
t≤T
C(t) > 0,C(T ) = q0 + |M |
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Pq0+|M |
(
min
t∈R+
C(t) > 0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1−η
> 0
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Firstly let us notice that (C(t))t only take values in q0 +RZ+SZ. Then we get:
∂tE(C(t)) =
∑
k,`∈Z
(q0 + kR − `S)∂tP(C(t) = q0 + kR − `S)
= v(β0R − ρ0S)
Let us compute for all t > 0 the variance of C(t).
∂tE(C(t)2) =
∑
k,`∈Z
(q0 + kR − `S)2∂tP(C(t) = q0 + kR − `S)
=
∑
k,`∈Z
(q0 + (k − 1)R − `S+R)2β0P(C(t) = q0 + (k − 1)R − `S)
+
∑
k,`∈Z
(q0 + kR − (`− 1)S− S)2ρ0P(C(t) = q0 + kR − (`− 1)S)
− E(C(t)2)
= β0R2 + ρ0S2 + 2E(C(t))∂tE(C(t))
= β0R2 + ρ0S2 + ∂tE(C(t))2
Then we have: ∀t > 0
V(C(t)) =
(
β0R2 + ρ0S2
)
t (22)
Then using the Chebyshev inequality we have the following concentration in-
equality: for all εt > 0
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P(|C(t)− E(C(t))| > εt) ≤ v t
ε2t
(
β0R2 + ρ0S2
)
. (23)
We now take for all η > 0, εηt = η
√
v
2 t (β0R2 + ρ0S2) and obtain (15).
Moreover we notice that
E(Cη(t))− εηt = q0 + t(β0(1− η−2)R − ρ0S)− η
√
v(β0R2 + ρ0S2)
√
t.
The minimum of t 7→ q0 + t(β0R − ρ0S)− η
√
v(β0R2 + ρ0S2)
√
t is reached in
t = vη
2(β0R2 + ρ0S2)
4(β0R − ρ0S)2 .
This minimum is q0 − vη
2((β0R2+ρ0S2))
4(β0R−ρ0S) . Hence for all τ such that:
τ + q0 − η
2v(β0R2 + ρ0S2)
4(β0R − ρ0S) > 0
We have:
Pq0
(
C(t) ≥ τ) ≥ 1− η−2.
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